The effects of the AIIB on the multilateral development banks’ system

The global system of multilateral development banks developed after the Second World War: in this system the United States is the dominant player, trying to enforce and expand its economic and political interests partially through these institutions themselves. Therefore, the foundation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, announced by China, has triggered various professional and political disputes, over whether the bank is an attempt to overthrow the existing financial system and political world order by the economically and politically increasingly powerful China, or it simply tries to meet the existing development needs of the region – naturally along its own economic interests. The article tries to find the answer to this question through the analysis of the approved and proposed projects of the Bank.

Authors: László Gere, Eszter Pálvölgyi-Polyák, Fruzsina Simigh

Introduction

Since its establishment was announced in 2013, the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank has been paid great attention to for its aims, and since it started operating, for its activities. Many analyses have been written on the possible economic, financial and political reform intentions of the Bank as well as its founder, China. Some of these consider the establishment of the Bank as a milestone which is going to disrupt the post-WWII global financial system and in the end also the world order built on that^[i],[ii]. Others are choosing their words more carefully, they do not think the AIIB has that serious politically disruptive role. They explain the demand to establish this institution with the infrastructural deficiencies and development needs in the Asian region, simply defining this process as a reaction for these development necessities.

The article has three main parts. The first one focuses on the background of the establishment of AIIB, highlighting China’s overcapacities and market opening challenges, together with the lagging of the broader region and its complex consequences, the significance of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the risks of the export-oriented Chinese economic growth. The second part focuses on the conflicts between the existing and the new institutional system. After the theoretical analysis, the third part would analyse the actual operation of the Bank through the examination of the financial composition of the Bank’s approved and proposed projects.

Our hypothesis is that the AIIB itself does not operate against the existing institutional system, since its real aim is to meet the development needs and complement the institutional deficiencies in co-operation with the other multilateral development banks. To justify that hypothesis, we have examined the bank’s projects to see if there are other international institutions involved in the certain projects or not, as well as to see the AIIB’s share in the certain developments’ budget.

Background for the establishment of the AIIB

According to a 2009 ADB (Asian Development Bank) report, by 2020 around $8 trillion will have been invested in infrastructure in Asia^[iii], 68% of which for new capacities, and in sectoral distribution, 51% for electricity, 29% for roads and 13% for the development of the ICT infrastructure^[iv]. China cited this report among others while establishing AIIB, claiming that the World Bank with its $220 billion or the ADB with its $160 billion capital still does not meet the needs of the world’s most rapidly developing and urbanizing region^[v] (according to other calculations, the emerging Asian countries would need $600 billion annually for infrastructure developments between 2010–2020 – even more, considering the climate change costs^[vi]). Infrastructure developments are essential to improve the competitiveness of South and Southeast Asian countries (just one example is that without greater capacity harbours, countries like Cambodia are unable to receive more goods from China – via large container ships^[vii]). These countries suffer from serious competitive disadvantages because of their infrastructure conditions, and their needs are underrepresented in the existing global financial system.^[viii]

At the same time, China has other motivations behind establishing this new institution. Xi Jinping announced the establishment of the AIIB roughly at the same time with the One Belt, One Road (September 2013, Kazakhstan) and the Maritime Silk Road (October 2013, Indonesia); therefore, the activities of the Bank are not coincidentally associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). All the more so because President Xi himself made it clear that the principal task of the Bank is to provide capital for the implementation of these initiatives^[ix]. BRI means continental infrastructure development, building highways, railroads, pipelines and optical cables from the economic centre of China through Central Asia to Russia and Western Europe, and its maritime part means the building of a network of harbours and coastline infrastructure from the East China ports through South and Southeast Asia to the Persian Gulf, East Africa and the Mediterranean region.^[x] The BRI serves the deeper integration of the region’s countries, enhances China’s “soft power”, which will be strengthened with the AIIB even more. These two initiatives (the BRI and the AIIB) show China’s ambitions to take a leading role that mirrors its emerging global power position^[xi]. The country is not only the region’s central player but also has world economic and global political role. According to many experts, the BRI extends China’s political strength, its access to energy sources and other resources (e.g. from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia), while trade and economic initiatives strengthen its geopolitical position as well. The BRI clearly serves market acquisitions, which is essential for China’s future economic growth. Another aspect is that it would connect the relatively peripheral, underdeveloped Western part of China to the global economy. The BRI would help to achieve the Chinese nation’s renewal, the so-called “Chinese Dream”.^[xii]

The announcement of the BRI was on account of China’s export-oriented economic growth as well, because after the economic crisis in 2008 the market potentials of its Western partners decreased, so the country had to find new markets. Before the crisis, China’s export growth was around 20% annually, which fell to -2.8% by 2013^[xiii]. China’s traditional export markets, the United States, Europe and Japan began to be saturated, or their growth was moderate. And the frequently communicated shift from the export-oriented growth to the domestic consumption’s intensification was easier on paper than in reality. Between 2000 and 2008, the export gave one-third of the economic growth. But it seems highly unrealistic that domestic demand could outweigh the weak demand of the traditional markets. In the near future the export will still be the most important engine of the Chinese economy; therefore, it is vital for the country to find new markets among the emerging economies, primarily in Asia where there are countries with significant population like India and Indonesia.

One geostrategic aspect also has to be highlighted: China, the world’s second largest economy, has urged the reform of the international financial system, claiming a greater share from the Western-dominated financial system, but because the progress in this direction had been stuck, the establishment of the AIIB was a great leap forward for the country. The USA has veto power in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Japan in the ADB, and China’s share and voting right in these institutions are far smaller than it would result from its economic power^[xiv],[xv].

Beside the economic gains there, are also political ones to implement activities under the umbrella of a multilateral institution, as these become politically more acceptable: the multilateral assistance is less connected to political interests, it facilitates the cooperation between different countries in a more neutral way compared to the bilateral agreements. It is China’s interest to attach positive initiatives to the country’s image instead of its negatively assessed international activities like the South China Sea dispute.^[xvi]

Conflicts between the existing and the emerging institutional system

Many experts claim that the establishment of the AIIB was one of the most spectacular events in the international financial sphere. They say, it is a milestone for China in its aspiration for creating a multipolar world order, according to others, it is only an experimental project instead of a dominant new model, it is not leading to stronger Chinese influence.^[xvii] In the following we would like to compare these two opposing viewpoints, together with the dominant arguments of the two sides.

The United States has mixed feelings from the beginning about China’s economic rise. It suspects that in the end China’s aim with its other financial initiations like the internationalisation of the renminbi (to be included in the IMF’s SDR-basket) is to undermine the global financial hegemony of the US. Some opinions assess the appearance of the AIIB as it is only and exclusively about politics as well as about how China could dominate Asia. The strongest statement says that the AIIB is only a war-chest, aiming to bribe all the countries from Dili, Timor-Leste to Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. This is not false accusation, since even the United States has confessed that the existence of the World Bank has secured the country’s political influence, Japan considers the ADB similarly. Therefore, in a way the suspicion of these countries is somehow right, that the appearance of the AIIB could erode their influence.^{[xviii],[xix],[xx]}

Although the USA and Japan have encouraged China for a long time to play greater role in the assistance of the emerging countries, in their view China should do that within the existing institutional structure, the World Bank, the IMF and the ADB.^[xxi]

Even before the foundation of AIIB, serious diplomatic rivalry has started between China and the United States, which has concluded in the “defeat” of the USA (considering the composition of the AIIB’s founding member states in the end), thus, a little bit exaggerating, it can be stated that the “United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system”^[xxii].

But is this alarm really justified?

Considering the size of the AIIB, it is not outstanding, just a medium-sized multilateral development bank. It does not seem to be a real challenger neither the ADB, nor the World Bank. But its significance does not lie primarily in its capital; from the viewpoint of building a new world order, its mere existence and the large number of its members is already notable.

According to the hegemony theories, it is of key importance that the hegemon (whether it is global or just regional) exercises its political, military and economic power through an existing institutional system, and it can enforce new rules among the international community members through that.^[xxiii] Therefore, the United States’ position in the global world order, and the era of Pax Americana, or the “American peace” can be rooted in WWII. Although the USA had significant economic superiority even from the 1870s, it gained the supervision over naval bases and accordingly, over world trade routes from the British through the Land-Lease Act in 1941. After that, the country has built the still dominant, so-called Bretton Woods system, which, through the establishment of the IMF and the World Bank, clearly based on the US dominance, and through the Marshall Plan, it helped to rebuild the war-stricken Europe (and convert it into a competent market)^[xxiv],[xxv]

However, in this system the emergence of China triggers serious tensions. Beijing is more and more frustrated by its under-representation in the World Bank’s quota system (the US has the only veto power with its 17% voting share, while China has only 4,87%), and the American Congress regularly balks its reform attempts.^[xxvi] Concerning the Japanese-led ADB, China also has only the fifth of the American or Japanese voting shares.^[xxvii] Since China has significant internal motivation and also possesses the necessary sources, its individual, alternative institution-building attempt seems to be a logical consequence in the process.^[xxviii]

Beyond the offensive communication of the Western professionals and the media, even before the actual operation of the AIIB, some kind of “infrastructure war” has begun: for instance, the ADB has announced its “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: Investment for Asia’s Future” fund, with a $110 billion capital (which exceeds the capital of the AIIB by $10 billion). Just before the meeting of the AIIB’s 57 prospective members in Singapore, the World Bank president, Jim Yong Kim has announced a new, $11 billion framework to finance the energetic, healthcare, educational and maritime economic investments of Indonesia. The winners of the competition are the region’s developing countries, because that way finally they will have the opportunity to develop their disadvantageous infrastructure faster.^[xxix]

The rivalry-narrative is not groundless at all. In his analysis Mishra (2016) reveals how the AIIB could influence on many levels the regional and international position of China:

• The institution is essential not only concerning the regional economic leading role of China, but also as a diplomatic initiative.
• Since the AIIB would give a large share of the BRI’s financing background, through that the Bank would contribute to the Chinese economic influence’s extension
• China’s aim now is to convert the regional economic order, which means that it would liberate the Asian economies from the Western dominance, directing them back to Asia, resulting a less dollar-dependent trade. Therefore, China plays a crucial role in other development banks besides the AIIB, like the New Development Bank, established especially for the BRICS countries, or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Development Bank (still under construction). The US understands the power the AIIB holds since the United States exercised its economic-political power for decades through its international finance institution system. Therefore, America is aware that it means not only an economic, but also a political and strategic advantage.^[xxx]

And now let us see the other side in this argument.

In contrast to the American fears, it is worth mentioning that at the market of “development banks” there are many other initiatives besides China’s^[xxxi]; therefore, it is not necessarily true that the new banks would pose a threat to the US or Japan. According to the Chinese viewpoint, only the development of the Asian–Pacific region would require extraordinary amount of sources, thus the AIIB would get on well with the World Bank and the Japanese-led ADB.

A multilateral institution also means an “umbrella”, and the multilateral assistance is less linked to political interests; it helps the cooperation of the countries in a more neutral manner compared to a bilateral agreement^[xxxii]. It is an important aspect for China, since its critiques frequently label its overseas investments as “colonialist” or “imperialist”.^[xxxiii]

Li and Jiang (2016) argue that the AIIB as a multilateral financing institute, aiming to promote the regional economic development through infrastructural investments, can have no influence on the global financing government by definition, namely on the financial supervisory cooperation and the reform of the international monetary system, and obviously does not threaten the US role in the global world order. The statements claiming that the AIIB assigns “the Eastern shift of the global power relations” are rather based on impressions than on objective analyses. Therefore, according to the authors, the AIIB is more adapting to the existing global financial government structure. Three aspects of that are:

• the business practice of the AIIB clearly seeks to cooperate with the other international financial institutions. Jin Liqun, AIIB president has always stressed, that the AIIB is more a complementary, not a substitute institution – it facilitates, not disrupts the existing international financial system.
• The AIIB represents a South–South cooperation, completing the North–South cooperation of the international development financing. The Chinese-led AIIB would likely take much more into account the specific circumstances of the developing Asian countries, rather than imposing financial assistance on political terms.
• The AIIB could catalyse the reform of the international monetary system, even though it has no direct impact on it.^[xxxiv]

Evaluation of the AIIB project list

To support our hypothesis formulated at the beginning of the article, we examined the available approved and proposed projects from the institution’s homepage by the end of February 2018. Although this list does not allow large-scale conclusions to be drawn, however, a comprehensive picture can be created with it on the Bank’s current and estimated activities. At the moment, the list contains 25 approved, ongoing, and 11 other proposed projects (Table 1).

Table 1: The list of the AIIB’s approved and proposed projects in descending order of the project’s total cost

The AIIB’s approved projects in descending order of the total project cost

1. Azerbaijan: Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP) 2. India: Bangalore Metro Rail Project – Line R6 3. Indonesia: National Slum Upgrading Project 4. Pakistan: Tarbela 5 Hydropower Extension Project 5. China: Beijing Air Quality Improvement and Coal Replacement Project 6. India: India Infrastructure Fund 7. India: Gujarat Rural Roads (MMGSY) Project 8. ASIA: IFC: Emerging Asia Fund 9. India: Andhra Pradesh 24×7 – Power For All 10. Philippines: Metro Manila Flood Management Project 11. Oman: Broadband Infrastructure Project 12. Bangladesh: Natural Gas Infrastructure and Efficiency Improvement Project 13. Indonesia: Regional Infrastructure Development Fund Project 14. Oman: Duqm Port Commercial Terminal and Operational Zone Development Project 15. Tajikistan: Nurek Hydropower Rehabilitation Project, Phase I 16. Georgia: Batumi Bypass Road Project 17. India: Transmission System Strengthening Project (Tamil Nadu) 18. Indonesia: Dam Operational Improvement and Safety Project Phase II 19. Pakistan: National Motorway M-4 Project 20. Bangladesh: Bangladesh Bhola IPP (Independent Power Producer) 21. Bangladesh: Distribution System Upgrade and Expansion Project 22. Myanmar: Myingyan Power Plant Project 23. Tajikistan: Dushanbe-Uzbekistan Border Road Improvement Project 24. Egypt Round II Solar PV Feed-in Tariffs Program: Al Subh Solar Power 25. Oman: Railway System Preparation Project

The AIIB’s 11 proposed projects in descending order of the total project cost

1. Turkey: Tuz Golu Gas Storage Expansion Project 2. India: Mumbai Metro Line 4 Project 3. India: National Investment and Infrastructure Fund 4. Georgia: 280 MW Nenskra Hydropower Plant 5. India: Amaravati Sustainable Capital City Development Project 6. Indonesia: Strategic Irrigation Modernization and Urgent Rehabilitation Project 7. India: Madhya Pradesh Rural Connectivity Project 8. India: West Bengal Major Irrigation and Flood Management Project 9. Sri Lanka: Solid Waste Management Project 10. Sri Lanka: Climate Resilience Improvement Project – Phase II 11. Laos: National Road 13 Improvement and Maintenance Project

Source: https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.html, and https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/proposed/index.html, query date: 02. 03. 2018

Some basic information about the projects: there are seven different types of projects (defined by the Bank): transport, energy, infrastructure, telecommunication, water, urban and multi-sector. Among the currently approved projects the energy (11) and transport (7) projects dominate, the others are mainly multi-sector (5) projects. The proposed projects are more diverse, there are transport (3) and water development (3), energy (2), infrastructure (1), multi-sector (1) and urban (1) projects.

Energy projects cover general energy supply network developments, developments related to traditional energy sources (e.g. natural gas pipelines), and also building or improvement of renewable energy systems (hydropower, solar energy). Transport development projects include developments of road or railway networks and also ports. In general, infrastructure developments focus on urban infrastructure. Multi-sector projects are mostly about the establishment of some kind of comprehensive development funds (e.g. infrastructure development funds), or the implementation of complex projects (e.g. slum upgrading), covering the infrastructure, housing, social networks and many other areas. Urban and regional infrastructure developments have other types as well, like telecommunication, urban or water developments.

The average project size is around $850 million. The project types and project costs show fairly large spread, there is no significant correlation between the project type and the project cost. It is understandable, because for instance among energy projects, we can find small-capacity solar energy constructions as well as state-level energy networks; among transport projects, we can find a project for building a short road section as well as the whole road network of a larger territory. The smallest project is the Railway System Preparation Project in Oman ($60 million), the largest is Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline Project (TANAP) in Azerbaijan ($8600 million).

In general, own contribution accounts for roughly one-third of the total project cost, which is provided almost always by the certain country’s or province’s governments. Another slightly more than one-quarter of the project costs is financed by other sources, on average. Other sources could mean different development funds or agencies, companies, private investors, but mostly they are labelled just as “other creditors” in the project budgets, their identity is unknown. In our later analysis, as our article focuses primarily on the role of multilateral banks, own contribution has been withdrawn from the project costs.

Among the 36 analysed projects, there are 9 (one-quarter) that are not financed by other multilateral banks, or at least the other project partners are unknown. All the others are co-financed by another multilateral development bank(s) beside the AIIB. The second most significant partner is the World Bank and the third is the ADB (considering the amounts they contribute to the projects, and the number of projects they are involved in^[xxxv]) (figure 1 and figure 2). Consequently, this analysis reveals that the AIIB cooperates most intensively with its loudest critics, the United States and Japan (or rather with the institutions led by these two countries: the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank).

By numbers, this means that the World Bank is involved in 19 projects in total (11 approved an 8 proposed), the ADB is in 5 (all approved). The EBRD- and EIB-loans appear in 2-2 projects, and in one project the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB) is also involved.

Figure 1:  The composition of project sources among approved projects (million USD) by 28 February 2018. Source: https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.html

Figure 2:  The composition of project sources among proposed projects (million USD) by 28 February 2018. Source: https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/proposed/index.html

During the analysis we also examined the share of AIIB sources of the certain projects. To calculate that, we deducted the amount of own contribution from each project’s total cost, and then the amounts thus obtained were proportioned to the AIIB sources. The results are summed up in figure 3 and figure 4 (approved and proposed projects).

Figure 3: Share of AIIB sources, among approved projects (%) (project costs without own contribution). Source: https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/approved/index.html

Figure 4: Share of AIIB sources, among proposed projects (%) (project costs without own contribution). Source: https://www.aiib.org/en/projects/proposed/index.html

The share of AIIB sources exceeds 50% among five approved projects. In all these projects, the Bank is practically the only financial institution involved. In case of the Indian project, the only partner is the Government of Gujarat; in case of the Bangladesh projects, there are implementing agencies named (the Bangladesh Rural Electrification Board and the Dhaka Electric Supply Company Limited, both of them are power service companies in Bangladesh); in case of the other three projects in Oman, local coordination and management organisations appear as creditors. In case of the majority of the projects (12), the AIIB loan’s share is between 50-30%, the rest is financed by the AIIB with less than 30%.

Among the proposed projects, the Indian Mumbai Metro Line 4 project is financed entirely by the AIIB. Most of the other projects (8) are financed between 50-40% by the AIIB, and in case of two the AIIB share is under 20%.

Considering all 36 projects, in six cases the World Bank’s loans exceeds the AIIB loans. In 11 additional cases, the two banks’ loans are equal, which means that in those cases where both banks are involved, there are no projects where the AIIB has higher share than the World Bank. The same comparison with the ADB results that in one case the AIIB-share is higher, in two cases both have equal share and in two cases the ADB-share exceeds the AIIB-share. The EBRD and the EIB are more marginal players, but the AIIB exceeds them in only one out of four cases.

This short comparison reveals that based on the analysis of the currently published projects it can be stated that the AIIB finances projects on its own only in a very few cases. Most of the developments are co-financed with other multilateral banks, in many cases with its so-called “rivals”, the World Bank or the ADB. Moreover, the AIIB appears in the co-financed projects mostly as an equal, or minor creditor. Based on this analysis, the view, according which the AIIB would disrupt the existing multilateral financing system by emerging as a dominant player in this area, is not proven. Moreover, those concerns are also not valid, according to which the Bank would not able to comply with the international standards, because in most cases the AIIB is only co-creditor, therefore, it has to adjust its own procedural rules to the other banks’.

The future role of the AIIB in the Asian development market is still open question. Although its international manner determines fundamentally the institutional standards, it cannot be ruled out that the more and more embedded institution will expand its influence more than the traditional players, thus becoming a regional hegemon.

Conclusion

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank has been a divisive institution ever since its announcement. Professionals and politicians have articulated many viewpoints on it: some considers it as an attempt to change the existing world order or at least part of the process of doing so, through which China’s ultimate goal is to eliminate to US hegemony. The institution’s existence goes far beyond itself, since based on its size and the number of its members it would be less “threatening”, but the offensive American communication on it suggested that the establishment of the Bank implies significant geo-economic, geostrategic and geopolitical changes.

However, as the institution has actually started its operation, these debates have finally settled. China has always stated that the AIIB just fills a long-standing development gap in the Asian–Pacific region, giving assistance for the developing countries to meet their huge infrastructure development needs. Therefore, it is not emerging as a rival against the other multilateral development banks, rather it would contribute to the catch-up process of the region in cooperation with them. Although the Chinese economic and strategic interests cannot be denied in this regard, but looking at the operation of the Bank so far, examining the creditor’s composition of its approved and proposed projects, we conclude that the AIIB is rather pursuing a cooperative policy; it works along with the existing players, regarding the project financing. Thus, the previous offensive commentary about the disruption of the world order and the current financial system seems to be unfounded so far. And also those critical voices claiming that the Bank would not comply with the standards and criteria of the international financial system, because by working together with other banks, the AIIB had to adapt their standards as well.

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[iii] ADB: Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2009. p. 167. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/159348/adbi-infrastructure-seamless-asia.pdf

[iv] The Economist: „The Asian Infrastructure Bank. The infrastructure gap.” The Economist, 21 March 2015 http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21646740-development-finance-helps-china-win-friends-and-influence-american-allies-infrastructure-gap

[v] The Economist: „Why China is creating a new »World Bank« for Asia”. The Economist, 11 November 2014 http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/11/economist-explains-6

[vi] IDS Policy Briefing: „What Can the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Learn from Other Development Banks?” Issue 113, April 2016. p. 1.

[vii] Hong, Yu: „Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”. Journal of Contemporary China, 2016. p. 7. DOI: 10.1080/10670564.2016.1245894

[viii] Wong, Sue-Lin: „China launches new AIIB development bank as power balance shifts”. Reuters, 17 Jan 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-aiib-investment-idUSKCN0UU03Y

[ix] Callaghan, Mike, Hubbard, Paul: „The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road”. China Economic Journal, 9:2, 2016. p. 119. DOI: 10.1080/17538963.2016.1162970

[x] Yeh, T. Emily: „The geoeconomics and geopolitics of Chinese development and investment in Asia”. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 2016. p. 1. DOI: 10.1080/15387216.2016.1237881

[xi] Hong, 2016. p. 2.

[xii] Ibid. pp. 3–6.

[xiii] Xing, Yuqing: „The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and China’s Role in Regional Economic Governance”. East Asian Policy, 2016. p. 27.

[xiv] Ibid. p. 8.

[xv] EPSC Strategic Notes: „The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank – A New Multilateral Financial Institution or a Vehicle for China’s Geostrategic Goals”. European Political Strategy Centre, Issue 1/2015 24 April. p. 1.

[xvi] Wan, 2016, p. 43.

[xvii] Li, Tao, Jiang, Zuoli: „Implication of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank for Global Financial Governance: Accommodation or Confrontation?” Tsinghua China Law Review, vol. 9. 2016. p. 140.

[xviii] Callaghan, Mike, Hubbard, Paul, 2016. pp. 123–124.

[xix] Hong, 2016.

[xx] Xing, 2016.

[xxi] Ibid. p. 31.

[xxii] Fleming-Williams, Mark.: „China’s New Investment Bank: a Premature Prophecy”. Stratfor, 22 April 2015 https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/chinas-new-investment-bank-premature-prophecy

[xxiii] Arrighi, Giovanni: „The Global Market”. Journal of World-Systems Research, Vol. V. No. 2. (1999). pp. 217–251.

[xxiv] Brzezinski, Zbigniew: The Grand Chessboard. Basic Books, New York. 1997. pp. 3–29.

[xxv] Fleming-Williams, Mark 2015

[xxvi] Simigh Fruzsina: „Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank”. PAGEO Geopolitikai Kutatóintézet, 19 March 2017 http://www.geopolitika.hu/en/2017/03/19/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank/

[xxvii] ADB: Asian Development Banks Shareholders as of 31. December 2016. https://www.adb.org/site/investors/credit-fundamentals/shareholders

[xxviii] Polyák Eszter: „Az Ázsiai Infrastrukturális Befektetési Bank első éves gyűlése”. PAGEO Geopolitikai Kutatóintézet, 5 August 2016 http://www.geopolitika.hu/hu/2016/08/05/az-azsiai-infrastrukturalis-befektetesi-bank-elso-eves-gyulese/

[xxix] Xing 2016, p. 36.

[xxx] White, Hugh: „AIIB: America’s influence in the balance”. Straits Times, 2014. http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/aiib-americas-influence-in-the-balance. Quotes: Mishra, Rahul: „Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: An Assessment”. India Quarterly 72(2) pp. 1-14, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA). DOI: 10.1177/0974928416643582

[xxxi] Faure, Raphaëlle, Prizzon, Annalisa, Rogerson, Andrew: „Multilateral development banks – A short guide”. Overseas Development Institute, London. 2015. https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/10098.pdf

[xxxii] Xing, 2016, p. 26.

[xxxiii] Yeh, 2016, p. 3.

[xxxiv] Li, Tao, Jiang, Zuoli, 2016

[xxxv] The TANAP project has in this case a significant distorting effect. The European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) are also heavily involved in the project, however, except for this case, their appearance is much more insignificant compared to the World Bank or the ADB. Therefore, the two European Banks are ranked behind the World Bank and ADB in this regard.